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Breton, Bataille and Lacan’s Notion of
“Transgressive” Sublimation
KLEM JAMES
University of Manchester

Associating the phenomena of transgressive love and sublimation or
considering the former an expression of the latter is not immediately
obvious. In the seventh seminar of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
however, Lacan posits an alternative to the Freudian view of
sublimation as a desexualising cathexis into creative or scientific
works1 of “a higher social or ethical valuation” (Freud, 2001 [1922-23],
p.256). He characterises it not as a re-direction of the libido to a nonsexual object à la Freud,2 but as a change in the position of the love
object within the structure of the subject’s fantasy life. For Lacan, this
object (either a person or a thing) has the capacity to be raised up
and transfigured metaphorically within the mind; furthermore, the
subject’s propensity to exalt the other in this way necessarily
increases to a backdrop of prohibition. Sublimation therefore has the
potential to defy those boundaries established by Christian
conservative ethics.
Although such irreverent ideas might suggest more of an obvious
kinship with the transgressive philosopher, Georges Bataille,3
1

In “Civilisation and Its Discontents” Freud defined sublimation as that which
“makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or
ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (2001 [1930],
p.97).
2
“The most important vicissitude which an instinct can undergo seems to be
sublimation; here both object and aim are changed, so that what was
originally a sexual instinct finds satisfaction in some achievement which is no
longer sexual” (Freud, 2001 [1922-23], p.256).
3
Bataille who started his career as a peripheral figure within Surrealism,
distanced himself from the movement in the late 1920s to create his own
journal, Documents. He was subsequently followed by a number of
important figures from within Surrealism (Denos, Leiris, Masson) who had
originally rallied around André Breton, though deserted him for both personal
and ideological reasons. Later on in his career, Bataille did however state
that he had always considered himself to be the “old enemy from within”
Surrealism (Bataille, 1994 [1946], p.49).

53

Volume 2 (1), 2009
ISSN 1756-8226

generally considered the arch-nemesis of surrealist leader, André
Breton, I now intend to show that, when applied to the writings of both
men, the Lacanian model of sublimation reveals a common
understanding of desire as predicated upon transgression. I hope
therefore to cast a new light upon a relationship which has generally
been characterised as antagonistic, with Breton being equated with a
sublimatory, idealising modernism and Bataille as the antithetical
desublimatory voice which took him to task for evading material
concerns. Moreover, the case for using Lacanian theory to offer a
new understanding of Surrealism seems particularly strong when we
consider that Lacan himself collaborated with the surrealists on the
journal Minotaur in the 1930s, in which time he became greatly
influenced by their writings on psychoanalysis and paranoia; and that
he later set about expounding his own theory of sublimation with
reference to their works.
One of the key terms with which Lacan defined sublimation was
“creation ex nihilo” (1992 [1959-60], p.115-27), meaning “creation
from nothing” and which in his writings plays with the idea of creating
meaning out of empty spaces, whether this is the conception of a
painting on an empty canvas; the shaping of a vase on a potter’s
wheel; the writing of poetry in the absence of love or the investment
of meaning in a desired and/or poeticised woman (whose “empty
space” is read by him as the vagina) (1992 [1959-60], p.162-63).
For Lacan, a striking example of creation ex nihilo was to be found in
the works of the courtly love poets of medieval France, the
troubadours, who frequently treated the exalted female love object
not only as an intangible romantic ideal but also as the focus of
intimate sensual (and sexual) contact which represented a
transgression of boundaries; for their works of courtly poetry
thematised all forms of absences and holes. Quoting one such poet,
Arnaud Daniel, Lacan reveals the stipulations of one particular Lady
to her courtier, which included “putting his mouth to her trumpet”
(1992 [1959-60], p.162) – a reference which “breaches the
boundaries of pornography to the point of scatology” (1992 [1959-60],
p.161) – though above all shows the vagina as reflective of a desire
with an emptiness at its core.
Within The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan also identifies a number
of surrealist poets – Breton, Péret and Éluard – who belong to the
same lineage as the troubadours and whose works are similarly cited
as examples of creation ex nihilo. Like Arnaud Daniel, their interest
was in writing about love not merely as a union of souls but also as
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an erotic union of bodies.4 The prodigious value the surrealists
attached to the experience of what might be termed free (or elective)
“terrestrial” love, with its emphasis on the personal and the sexual,
and unencumbered by the constraints of marriage, certainly placed
them at the antipodes of the religious orthodoxy of French society
during the interwar years, for whom the enticements of such love
were taboo.
In opposition to such a view, these enticements were placed at the
very cornerstone of the surrealist social revolution and provided one
of the prime motives to denigrate the church for its repressive
influence upon the collective psyche of society. In the two
manifestoes of Surrealism, Breton exhorted readers to “kill, fly faster,
love to your heart's content” (1969 [1953], p.13) vituperated against
“family, country, religion” (1969 [1953], p.128), promised to restore
meaning the notion of love in defiance of its detractors (1969 [1953],
p.181) and came to the defence of the surrealist infatuation with
Sade, the hero who sought to “make the mind get rid of its chains”
(1969 [1953], p.186). Breton’s manifestoes were in many respects a
rallying cry for citizens to break the boundaries established by a
pervasive Christian conservative ethos.
From a moral perspective, Breton and the surrealists might therefore
not be so remote from George Bataille as might be presumed. Even
so, many critics prefer to recall only the comparatively short-lived spat
between both men in the late 1920s, when as an advocate of base
materialism, Bataille famously arraigned Breton for being an “Icarian”
idealist (1970 [1930], p.93-109) and thus an agent of his self-undoing.
It is above all the October critics,5 such as Hal Foster, Rosalind
Krauss, Denis Hollier and Yve-Alain Bois (considered by many as the
foremost authority on modern art) who have characterised the
polemic between these two men (and their adherents) in purely
4

Breton affirms for example that “it is absolutely true that carnal love is at
one with spiritual love. Their reciprocal attraction must be strong enough to
bring about perfect unity at once organic and psychic through their being
absolutely complementary” (1969 [1953], p.301). His view might be
compared with Péret’s conception of love: “the conjunction of all
sublimations, regardless of the path that they have taken, the locus where
the spirit, the flesh and the heart come to be merged in an imperishable
diamond” (my translation) / “la conjonction de toutes les sublimations,
quelque voie qu’elles aient empruntée, le lieu géométrique où viennent se
fondre en un diamant inaltérable, l'esprit, la chair et le cœur” (1956, p.9).
5
October is the name of a major American art journal founded in 1976
specialising in contemporary art, theory and criticism. Its editors and
contributors are amongst the most renowned art critics of the Englishspeaking world.

55

Volume 2 (1), 2009
ISSN 1756-8226

oppositional terms, resorting to the clichés of Breton, the romantic
sublimator, and Bataille, the advocate of “desublimation” and base
materialist:
it is at this point where sublimation confronts desublimation that
Surrealism breaks down, and I mean this literally: such is the stake
between official Bretonian and dissident Bataillean factions circa 1929
[...].
(Foster, 1993, p.110)

It is the binarism of this view which I hope to challenge within this
article; in order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to give a
cursory overview of Lacanian theory, firstly to show the mechanics of
how sublimation operates as “creation ex nihilo” and secondly to
elucidate its transgressive nature. I will then consider how this theory
is germane to the positions of both Breton and Bataille.
According to Lacan, when the cherished love object is adulated and
elevated in sublimation (as is in the case in troubadour and surrealist
poetry), this serves, albeit temporarily, to complete the subject’s
existence, to relocate what Lacan terms the ego’s “prehistoric Other”
(1992 [1959-60], p.56) – commonly perceived as the subject’s ‘other
half’ – without which the individual labours with a certain sense of
existential vacuity. Lacan terms this unspecified sense of psychic lack
“das Ding” (the German word for “the thing”). The exact formula for
sublimation given by Lacan is the raising of the object “to the dignity
of das Ding” (1992 [1959-60], p.112) implying an undue exaltation of
and overinvestment in the Other. In other words, from identifying a
desirable “something” in the external world, the subject mythologises
and refashions it into the signifier of its complementary Other with the
implications of dreamlike romance, false hopes and emotional selfdeception this entails (all forms of a vain exaltation of the Other).6
For Lacan, sublimation is furthermore characterised by a circular
quest or detour which consists of continually recuperating and
refinding the lost love object or “das Ding”: “it is in its nature that the
object as such is lost. It will never be found again. Something is there
while one waits for something better, or worse, but which one wants”
(1992 [1959-60], p.52) and again “[das Ding] is to be found at the
most as something missed. One doesn’t find it, but only its
pleasurable associations” (1992 [1959-60], p. 52). This principle also
evokes Bataille’s statement in The Solar Anus that “movement is a
figure of love, incapable of stopping at a particular being, and rapidly
6

This for Lacan is perhaps the ultimate expression of creation ex nihilo.
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passing from one to another” (1985 [1931], p.7). This sense of
perpetual movement to relocate the lost love object is quite apparent
in a number of Breton’s literary works, in particular Nadja,
Communicating Vessels and Mad Love, all three of which bear
testament to its elusiveness:
I was, I say, like a man who, thinking he has done everything to conjure
the fates contrary to love, has had to yield to the evidence that the
person most necessary for him for a long time had retreated, that the
very object that had been for him the keystone of the material world was
lost.
(Breton, 1997 [1932], p. 68)

Such a view of love, which implies that man is unable to content
himself with one love object, automatically opens the door to
controversy for it effectively questions the immutability of those
boundaries posited by Christian doctrine for human relationships (in
other words, a life-long, monogamous commitment to a romantic and
sexual partnership as consecrated through marriage). At a time, when
the commandment “thou shalt not commit adultery” still had great
currency in society, Lacan and the surrealists were implying that
(wo)man’s basic nature urges him/her to do exactly the reverse.
In the seventh seminar Lacan is indeed quite explicit about this fact.
He specifies that das Ding is predicated upon interdiction – the love
object, raised up the level to the level of das Ding, frequently having a
prohibitive or sinful quality attached to it and being forbidden by law.
Citing those laws which form the very basis of the Judeo-Christian
monotheistic religions, the Ten Commandments, he states:
Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know of the Thing
by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea to covet
it if the Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it”.
(Lacan, 1992 [1959-1960], p. 83)

This then refers to the proverbial tenet that it is the prohibition of an
act that makes it more seductive. The terms “Das Ding” and “sin” are
for Lacan kindred terms.7

7

“I believe that for a little while now some of you at least have begun to
suspect that it is no longer I who has been speaking. In fact, with one small
change, namely ‘Thing’ for ‘sin’ this is the speech of Saint Paul on the
subject of the relations between the law and sin in the Epistle to the
Romans, Chapter 7, paragraph 7” (Lacan, 1992 [1959-60], p.83).
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He continues by explaining that laws such as the Ten
Commandments underpin communication between human beings,
regulating and offsetting desire in such a way as to increase man’s
sense of temptation. With increased temptation comes the potential
for increased pleasure. Lacan terms this pleasure jouissance (the
French word for “climax” or extreme “pleasure”), which in the seventh
seminar is characterised as the excessive excitation which results
from a forbidden desire and which Lacan in his later work will bring
into closer proximity with sublimation.8
The interdiction of jouissance may according to Lacan even extend to
a punishment of death. To illustrate the point, he quotes Kant’s
categorical imperative and his example of the man who must decide
between renouncing a highly pleasurable yet illicit relationship, on the
one hand, and, the penalty of death for pursuing the relationship, on
the other. Kant states that the man would in accordance with the
categorical imperative choose to renounce the relationship (the
implication being that, the alternative would, if applied on a mass
scale, terminate life and annul the rule of law). For Lacan, Kant is
missing the point – the very reason for illicit relationship was based
on a fear of a punitive measure such as death; or as Bataille puts it:
“eroticism opens the way to death” (1986 [1957], p.24).
As Lacan’s own references show, many of the surrealists’ works on
love exhibit the hallmarks of this transgressive sublimation – in
particular, an overvaluation of the love object especially when
contextualised by fear, instability or the threat of death. The apogee
of Breton’s semi-autobiographical novel, Mad Love (which also reads
as a treatise on love), adumbrates the consummation of his
relationship with a lady (Jacqueline Lamba), whom he encounters
quite arbitrarily as a stranger on the streets of Paris (though who
subsequently becomes his second wife). The moment is allegorised
as an ascent into the mountains and the attainment of “the sublime
point”, the exalted vantage point of a bucolic and sublime landscape
which represents the fulfilment of one’s every desire. Such a
metaphoric ascent is of course reflective of an exalted love though it
is clear that the poignancy of the moment would be nullified if
references to their sexual communion and attendant sense of danger
8

The formulation of jouissance will become increasingly elaborate
throughout Lacan’s career. In the seminar “D’un AUTRE à l’autre” (English
title: “From One Other to the Other” though unpublished in English), Lacan
will situate sublimation at the very centre of the experience of jouissance
according to the formula: “Sublimation as a means of reaching jouissance”
(my translation) / “La Sublimation pour atteindre la jouissance” (Lacan, 196869, p.225-26).
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were altogether absent. Although the sexual detail of this experience
is to a large degree poeticised, Breton is compelled to recognise, and
even venerate, the erotic “delirium of absolute presence” (1987
[1937], p.76):
Love, the only love that you are, carnal love, I adore, I have never
ceased to adore your lethal shadow, your mortal shadow. A day will
come when man will be able to recognise you for his only master,
honouring you in the mysterious perversions you surround him with.
(Breton, 1987 [1937], p.76)

Lacan remarks of Breton’s work that “it is once again in the place of
the Thing that Breton had the madness of love emerge” (1992 [195960], p.154). Breton’s ascent into the mountain certainly evokes das
Ding and with it das Ding’s transgressive foundation, showing us that
as the love object is exalted, we are ineluctably lead to the potential
deadliness of jouissance. Physical love is for example described by
Breton as casting a poisonous, deadly shadow and rather strikingly
he qualifies the beginning of this passage with these words of
caution: “Nevertheless, they are there, all the interdictions, the alarm
bells, all ready to be set off, the snowy bells of the datura in case we
might decide to place this insuperable barrier between the others and
ourselves” (1987 [1937], p.76). Here Breton specifically conjoins the
notions of interdiction with lethality through the image of the datura, a
literary motif for both deadly noxiousness and an inability to
distinguish illusions from reality (both of these being implied also by
Lacanian sublimation). Moreover, Breton refers to the “insuperable”
boundaries, which would ordinarily keep the individual from
embarking upon an arbitrary sexual adventure, but which in Breton’s
case seem only to have increased the lethal pull of the erotic.
The historical context in which the events occur is not insignificant in
exposing the potentially noxious consequences of such desire.
Breton’s restless pursuit of love (both romantic and physical) will have
appeared as an affront to many sections of society. At this time in
France’s history – the interwar years – church and state had still
programmed society in such a way as to prejudice its members
against second marriages. When the surrealist film L’Âge d’Or – a
cinematographic call to arms against the instruments of sexual
repression – was screened in 1939, it depicted an upper-middle class
woman fetishistically sucking on the toe of a statue. The response
elicited by the film was so fierce that riots broke out in the cinema,
surrealist paintings were slashed in the cinema vestibule, the
surrealists were denounced by the press and the film was banned
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from any further commercial showings. Breton’s conception of
jouissance is then like Lacan’s regulated by law which is both
religious and social in its foundation; at times seeming an insuperable
boundary to self-expression.
This is also implied in what Breton then goes on to say about
temptation. Speaking of the forbidden fruit, Breton claims that it does
not exist and desire itself is contingent upon a sense of temptation:
Only temptation is divine. To feel the need to vary the object of this
temptation, to replace it by others – this bears witness that one is about
to be found unworthy, that one has already doubtless proved unworthy of
9
innocence [/ that one already deserves to fall from grace].
(Breton, 1987 [1937], p.92)

The statement’s resemblances with Lacanian thought are striking.
Breton is stating that temptation is absolutely integral to desire and,
furthermore, that in order for this desire to be sustained and renewed
the love object must be varied. The state of grace as Breton
conceives it is to be consumed by the passion of love, “to find once
more the lost grace of the first moment when one is in love” (Breton,
1987 [1937], p.44). As is the case with all states of grace then, when
it is lost, there emerges a corresponding need to recuperate it,
implying in Breton’s case the kind of libidinal circularity which
following Lacanian theory is so characteristic of human relationships.
Bretonian grace is also situated amid the throws of terrestrial love
rather than issuing from a non-existent God (Breton, 1987 [1937],
p.44 and 84). As such, Breton is actually proposing something rather
subversive: in reclaiming the rights of the fallen man – and above all
in his quest for earthly love and valorisation of temptation – he is
taking an almost Luciferean stance. His intention is to usurp the cult
of organised religion with the cult of (free) love and he achieves this
with a good measure of profanity. Rather provocatively he proclaims
for instance that it is an enduring fantasy of his to make love with a
nun in the deepest recesses of the church (1992 [1928-32], p.14).
Most remarkably of all, however, is that in making these statements,
in pushing the boundaries of moral palatability almost to the level of
indecency, he is identifying not with the ideal but with the material and
the earthly, which has so frequently been considered to be the sole
province of Bataillean philosophy.
9

The expression “démérité de l’innocence”, which is contained within the
French original, can also be translated as “deserving to fall from grace” –
hence its inclusion by the author in square brackets.
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Breton’s conception of desire as predicated upon interdiction is one
which will remain with him, and indeed ripen, throughout the
remainder of his life. In 1959, toward the end of his career and by way
of an introduction to the International Surrealist Exhibition whose
leitmotif was eroticism, Breton writes once again not only in support of
transgressive desire but highlights philosophy’s indebtedness to
George Bataille for his insights into the subject:
[quoting Bataille] “The inner experience of eroticism demands from the
person involved an equal sensitivity towards the anguish which provides
the basis for interdiction and the desire which tends to violate it”
This interdiction, which has existed since time immemorial and continues
to hold sway in every latitude over so-called “savage” and so-called
“civilised” races alike, is the true target at which eroticism aims its arrow.
I have no doubt that it will become increasingly explicit to the extent that
we succeed in disentangling it from the dense undergrowth of prejudices
which cover it. However, it would be idle to hope to advance here in the
full light of day. Anyone who flatters himself on having braved prejudice
and interdiction simultaneously, without turning a hair, will find himself
disqualified from dealing with eroticism, since his own consciousness
10
has failed to realise eroticism’s fundamental need for transgression.
(Breton, 1972 [1959], p.378-89)

Breton is insistent that to confront the true nature of erotic desire an
openness is required toward its transgressive nature as well as the
overcoming of one’s own prejudices (which stands perhaps in
contrast to the young Breton’s rather more judgemental attitude
towards non-heteronormative forms of sexual behaviour).11
As these are the carefully elaborated views of a seasoned Breton, I
believe this makes them all the more definitive and complete; and that
they detract from the commonly held view of Breton as an idealising
romantic who disdains Bataillean thought for its defence of the erotic.
For what also points to the maturation and increasing openness of
Breton’s attitude is his approbatory tone toward George Bataille to
whom he pays homage at the very start of the text for having
advanced the boundaries of humanity’s knowledge of eroticism: “It is
Georges Bataille, again who, in the course of an urgent and often
moving investigation of the subject, has succeeded best in making us
apprehend eroticism for what it is, that is to say an ‘immediate aspect
10

Breton’s italics.
Examples of such attitudes are to be found in Investigating Sex where
Breton famously inveighs against homosexuality (1992 [1928-32], p.5, p.2728 and p.132) and unquestioning libertinism (1992 [1928-32], p. 32).

11
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of inner experience, opposing itself to animal sexuality’” (1972 [1959],
p.377) and whom, as we can see in the quote above, he adduces in
defence of transgression.
On the relationship between interdiction and desire, it is clear from
Bataille’s own writings that he does not differ greatly from Breton on
the matter. The fifth chapter of Bataille’s Erotism, entitled
“transgression”, is peppered with variants on the axiom that “[t]he
taboo [or “that which is forbidden”], is there in order to be violated”12
(1986 [1957], p.64). Bataille also situates his view of erotic
transgression in opposition to Christian orthodoxy, situating “the
forbidden” with sin and sensuality13 and stating that the Luciferian fall
represents an impoverishment of the divine rather a vital segregation:
the fact that there might have existed a devil meant that the divine
separated into two parts which ignored and failed to recognise one
another. The divine part became impoverished. Now I don’t believe that
today one can represent a sense of the sacred if one does not at the
same time take note of the totality of those aspects, which are the divine
14
and the diabolical.
(Bataille, 1979 [1951], p.188)

The thematics of his literary works, such as Story of the Eye, are also
entirely blasphemous, pushing the boundaries of taste to new limits
and covering such themes as scatology, humiliation, rape, torture,
and necrophilia. Like Breton, Bataille also relishes the representation
of sexual acts which are performed in churches (such as the sexual
assault and asphyxiation of a priest in Story of the Eye). Both men
12

The original does not make reference to taboo, but to “l’interdit”, which
means literally “that which is forbidden” and hence its enclosure in square
brackets – “L’interdit est là pour être violé” (Bataille, 1979 [1957], p.72).
Variations of the same principle are to be found elsewhere in the chapter.
For example: “The transgression does not deny the taboo [the forbidden] but
transcends it and complements it” (Bataille, 1986 [1957], p.63) / “religion is
the moving force behind the breaking of taboos [transgression of what is
forbidden]” (Bataille, 1986 [1957], p.69).
13
“It is in such representations of crime and sensuality that I have sought to
locate what I call sin” (my translation) / “C’est dans ces représentations de
crime et de sensualité que j’ai cherché à situer ce que j’appelle le péché”
(Bataille, 1979 [1944], p.341).
14
My translation. Original text reads: “le fait qu’il y eut le diable voulait dire
que le divin se séparait en deux parties qui devait s’ignorer et se
méconnaître l’une l’autre. La partie divine pure s’appauvrit. Or je ne crois
pas que l’on puisse se représenter aujourd’hui le sentiment du sacré si l’on
n’aperçoit en même temps la totalité de ces aspects, divin et diabolique”
(Bataille, 1979 [1951], p.188).
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show how the desire to represent and possess das Ding through a
range of different signifiers is exacerbated in face of Christian moral
imperatives, which threaten to repress rather than liberate the human
subject. Lacan’s theory of das Ding being regulated by the law
(specifically moral law) seems therefore vindicated by both men.
In opposition to religious law, Breton posits the perverse, expressing
a preference for “everything in physical love which pertains to
perversity” (1992 [1928-32], p.29). In Investigating Sex: Surrealist
Research, he admits the practices of free love, sodomy, onanism,
semi-exhibitionism, sadism and lesbianism, which far from being
considered perverse by today’s standards were certainly
anathematised as such by the Christian orthodoxy of the day. Of all
these practices it is sodomy he favours the most for its “moral nonconformity” (1992 [1928-32], p.151) – in other words because of the
deviation it represents from sexual protocol in a Christian marriage.
Here once again a hidden affinity emerges with Bataille as he too is
opposed to all of the sexual conventions which accompany a
Christian marriage (sex for the propagation of the human species,
coital sex). As Geoffrey Roche explains:
for Bataille it is the very sinfulness of sexual activity that makes it
significant. Without the sin of breaking taboos, according to Bataille, sex
is not “erotic”. Therefore, sex within marriage, where there are no
traditional taboos against sex, is not erotic; marriage itself providing only
a “narrow outlet for pent-up violence”.
(Roche, 2006, p.167)

Bataille, then, viewed marriage as the very negation of the erotic,
being merely a repository for frustrated or unsublimated aggression.
Further resistance to moral conformity is demonstrated by both men
in their conceptualisations of women. For Breton, this is reflected by
his rejection of chastity in women (translated in French as “pudeur”)
on account of its associations with Christianity. His conception of the
woman is at least based as much on la femme-sorcière (“the womansorceress”) as la femme-enfant (“the woman-child”), his ideal of
womanhood, therefore, derived not from the Virgin Mary but from the
ghostly vampire women (or succubae) of his dreams (1992 [1928-32],
p.59-60) and the paintings of Gustave Moreau15 (1972 [1961], p.363).
Similarly, Bataille’s depictions of women frequently centre about their
15

One of Moreau’s most famous paintings which provided literary inspiration
for Breton as well as Moreau’s contemporaries, such as Huysmans and
Wilde, was Salomé, who despite her captivating beauty, infamously had
John the Baptist’s head served on a plate.
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sinful aspect, claiming prostitutes to be “fallen beings” (1986 [1957],
p.135; 1993 [1949], p.140) and the sight of a woman’s breasts “the
pure incarnation of sin” (1988 [1954], p.127). The conceptions of
women advanced by both Breton and Bataille are also spectral and
empty in nature being oneiric, mythological, artistic or literary but
seldom based entirely within the real.
Lacan comments that such depersonalising characterisations of the
female love object are a frequent attribute of (courtly) love poetry, the
woman being “emptied of all real substance”16 as she is elevated;
then becoming “terrifying – an inhuman partner” (1992 [1959-60],
p.150). All poets who can be aligned with this tradition (including the
surrealists) are according to Lacan merely addressing the same lady
“who is never characterised for any of her real, concrete virtues, for
her wisdom, her prudence, or even her competence” (1992 [1959-60],
p.150). For Lacan, this is, moreover, one of the defining features of
artistic and literary sublimation, though paradoxically such sublimation
also has the capacity to debase: “It is only when the person involved
is transformed into a symbolic function that one is able to speak of
her in the crudest terms” (1992 [1959-60], p.149).
When applied to Breton’s writings, Lacanian theory shows us once
again that it is at the sight of das Ding that we are able to find both
sublimation (a desire to exalt) and, coextensive with it, desublimation
(a desire to reduce and simplify; and a corresponding desire to
transgress). Lacan’s study underlines that the term “sublimation” is in
itself problematic and perhaps even ambiguous if it contains the seed
of desublimation within it. However, as has been stated in a recent
study on the importance of sublimation within art: “sublimation is
Janus-faced poised between the raw singularity of the drive and the
polite decorum of the art gallery” (Thurston, 2003, p.30). Such a view
of sublimation clearly diverges from Freud’s rather sanitising view of
the phenomenon (in which both aim and object are made to serve
non-sexual ends) – and is perhaps all the more disconcerting for it. In
addition to the unexpected antinomy which sublimation opens out
upon, we are faced with the moral contentiousness which surrounds
the very representation of das Ding – its capacity to challenge the
boundaries of convention – whether in art and literature or via the
16

Such sublimation has met with feminist criticism even within Surrealism
itself. In an article entitled “Introduction à une érotique révolutionnaire”, René
Passeron wrote that: “it is not in sublimating a being that one liberates them.
Sublimation has always its inverse, oppression... It is not by celebrating
Mélusine that we shall advance a step towards the reign of desire, but by
subjecting to materialist method the myths by which woman is lulled the
better to be exploited” (1948, p.39).
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signifying chain of individuals encountered in life who take on function
of our “absolute Other”. According to Lacan, such representations
only come into relief when in collision with the boundaries established
religious, social and moral precepts. Homologous to this principle, we
find two factions of the same movement, whose meaning and
purpose were established by Breton and Bataille in opposition to the
social mores of their day. It is for this reason that, following the logic
of the Lacanian Ding, it seems otiose to consider sublimation or
desublimation the sole province of either writer.
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